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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DELBERT MARRIOTT 
and HELEN H. MARRIOTT, his 
wife; M. STEWART MARRIOTT 
and LAURA MARRIOTT, his wife; 
CALEB :MARRIOTT, a single 
man; GILBERT ENOS MAR-
RIOTT and HELEN A. F. MAR-
RIOTT, his wife; and ETHEL 
TRACY, a woman, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11088 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a highway condemnation action brought 
by plaintiff to acquire lands of the defendants in Ogden 
City, Weber County, for the Interstate Freeway Proj-
1 
ect, wherein the sole issue before the lower court related 
to determining the value of an .83 acre tract of land 
being acquired for highway purposes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The value issue was tried by a jury, and a verdict 
was returned setting the value of the land acquired at 
$7 ,500.00, which was the exact amount testified to by 
the plaintiff's expert witness as being its value. 
Defendants filed a Motion For New Trial (R. 46), 
based upon several errors which they contended were 
committed by the Court and opposing counsel. The 
Motion For New Trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment on 
Verdict entered in this matter and of the Order denying 
their motion for a new trial, and request that the matter 
be returned to the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County for a new trial on the sole issue 
of damages to be awarded for the tract of unimproved 
land taken in these proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 21, 1965, plaintiff filed a Complaint 
against defendants to acquire from them a triangular 
shaped tract of unimproved land on the west boundary 
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of Ogden City, at the intersection of Pennsylvania 
Avenue and 26th Street (Tr. 38, 52), for purposes 
incidental to construction of Interstate Freeway I-15, 
which ran northwesterly through the general area (Tr. 
-1!3). The freeway construction contemplated a built-up 
earthen fill of 25 feet as it crossed over Pennsylvania 
Avenue and the contiguous railroad spur track. 
The tract of land involved consisted of .83 net 
acre (Tr. 46-67-and see the large Trial Map: Exh. 
A) . The land was bordered on its .south side by 26th 
Street and along the northerly side by Pennsylvania 
Avenue (which was in a northeasterly-southwesterly 
angle to the property). The west tip of the subject 
tract was in a five-point highway intersection area 
where five converging roads came together (Tr. 52, 67) . 
The property was zoned M-2 at the time (Tr. 48, 
69) , and was served by all necessary utilities, including 
sewer (Tr. 110). 
Each litigant produced one expert witness for the 
purpose of establishing value. The witness for defend-
ants, Harold Welch, testified that the highest and best 
use of the subject property at the time of taking was 
for a commercial service station site furnishing gas 
and other services to motorists (Tr. 48, 57), and valued 
the land at $35,000.00; plaintiff's witness, Gregory 
Austin, testified that the highest and best use of the 
property was that adaptable to a light industrial site 
(Tr. 113), and valued it at $7,500.00. 
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The jury verdict awarded defendants $7,500.00 
for the property. 
Defendants contend that, because of errors and 
abuse of discretion committed by the trial judge, to-
gether with improper argument made by opposing 
counsel in his summation to the jury, they were denied 
a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed them under 
the laws and Constitution of Utah and the United 
States. Because defendants contend that the prejudi-
cial actions denying them a fair trial commenced with 
the empanelling of the jury, and continued to the mo· 
ment the jury retired to deliberate, further facts will 
be stated in the chronology of points contained in the 
following argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A JUROR'S PERSONAL FEELINGS CON· 
CERNING THE LAW OR WHAT IT SHOULD 
BE IS NOT A PROPER SUBJECT OF IN· 
QUIRY ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. 
At the commencement of trial, after the Clerk had 
drawn the names of the 14 jurors to be examined, the 
trial judge generally informed the jury as to the nature 
of the case, that the Constitution and laws of Utah 
provide that a landowner should be paid compensation 
if his lands are taken for public projects, and that the 
law of eminent domain allowed the government to take 
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properties from a landowner without his consent for 
highway purposes because, otherwise, one might find 
" ... somebody in the middle of a highway that wanted 
a million dollars . . . " (Tr. 18) . The Court further 
went on to point out that for the lands actually taken 
a landowner should be paid fair market value, that the 
state legislature " ... expanded on it just a little ... 
to provide for severance damages ... ," and that, if the 
public project benefitted the remaining lands of the 
owner, offsetting benefits should be deducted from 
severance damages since " ... they don't want to give 
away the public money that way, ... " (Tr. 19). 
After generally stating the law, the trial judge 
then asked each prospective juror to stand up and state 
his thinking as to " ... how you happen to feel about 
this law" ( Tr. 19) . Each juror was also asked " . . . 
if you had been a legislator (whether) you might have 
been more generous or less generous about it." 
The general comments as to what the law was, as 
explained by the trial judge, may not have had a preju-
dicial effect upon the jurors if the matter had simply 
been dropped without getting into a discussion with 
the various jurors. However, it soon became evident 
that the case was starting off with a very subtle advan-
tage in favor of the State Road Commission, as com-
ments from the prospective jurors started coming forth: 
" ... As a taxpayer I don't think any exces-
sive payments or grants should be made to the 
property owner. Taxes are high enough now." 
(Tr. 20) 
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"I think it is a very good law. It would be 
pretty hard to have growth without it." 
"I think we all have to give way to progress 
and sometimes the individual who is giving awav 
to progress doesn't always benefit as he feels h.e 
should, but we have to regulate all of those things 
by law." (Tr. 22) 
The thinking of the remaining prospective jurors 
generally fell in line with the comments made by the 
first two or three, and eventually the interrogation 
turned to other subjects. 
Defendants submit that the explanation given to 
the prospective jurors, both before interrogating them 
and as they were being interrogated, is a more proper 
subject to be included in Instructions at the end of the 
trial, and should not be the subject of extensive inter· 
rogation during their selection. In addition to setting 
the stage for a trial favorable to the condemnor, there 
is another objection that does not readily appear. For 
instance, if any juror on the panel had feelings differ· 
ent from what the law was, it is very obvious that those 
feelings would almost have to be in the direction of 
being more favorable to the property owner losing 
his land. Accordingly, while in many cases the interro· 
gation of the type conducted by the Court in this in· 
stance might not be harmful, the only conclusion which 
can be drawn from an interrogation of this type is that 
it serves no purpose beneficial to a property owner, 
that it places the condemning agency in a favorable 
light and, at the same time, serves as an effective tool 
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for "smoking out" any juror who might have feelings 
farnrable to the property owner. Thus, the procedure 
here followed simply the purposes of the plaintiff. 
In the case of State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 
3(i5 P. 2d 798 ( 1961), the Utah Supreme Court had 
before it on appeal a case which posed a similar question 
and which was appealed from the same source as the 
case at bar. In that case the trial judge gave quizzes 
to prospective jurors to determine their qualifications 
to become members of a jury panel. In commenting 
upon such method of selecting jurors this Court said on 
page 799: 
"There is no statutory provision for the giving 
of tests by a court to qualify persons called for 
jury duty. The court erred in restricting the 
jury panel to those who it thus determined were 
qualified. The procurement of a panel by this 
method could tend to deny a party a fair cross 
section of citizens of the county in which the trial 
is being held . . . " 
This Court in that case went on to mitigate its 
stand against such quizzes by stating that the questions 
might have been intended to determine the qualification 
of prospective jurors under Sections 78-46-8 and 78-
46-9, U. C. A., 1953. 
In the instant case there can be no doubt that the 
trial judge's searching questions did not go to the fitness 
or competency of prospective jurors. The questions 
had no relationship to statutory qualifications. Instead, 
the questions went to the matter of general bias towards 
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the law of the State of Utah. Specifically, the questions 
were directed to ferret out only those persons against 
whom the state as condemnor would most likely use its 
peremptory challenges. 
This type of conduct, where a trial judge has con-
tributed to the selection of jurors by ferreting out thost 
other than prospective jurors lacking statutory quali-
fications, has been condemned by this Court in the 
case of State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead. 
82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612 (1933). In that case this 
Court held it to be an abuse of discretion for a judge 
to challenge for cause (bias) on his own motion. Af· 
firmatively stated, a judge can only dismiss a juror on 
his own motion when the juror lacks the statutory 
qualifications. If a judge cannot ferret out for cause 
challenges then, a fortiori, he should not be allowed to 
search out peremptory challenges. 
Undoubtedly, the trial judge has considerable 
latitude in ascertaining the fitness and competency of 
jurors to sit in a cause. As much is clear from Rule 47 
(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and from 
the case of State v. Gregorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 P. 2d 
893 (1933). 
Nevertheless, the Gregarious case contains a caveat 
against questioning by the judge as to the views of the 
prospective jurors. On page 894 this Court made clear 
the fact that a difference exists betwen admonishing 
jurors on points of law and between ascertaining state 
of mind concerning the law. 
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" ... Further, we do not see anything objec-
tionable to the questions propounded unless it 
be the last two questions, because they were more 
in the nature of admonitions to the jurors than 
of ascertaining state of mind." (emphasis add-
ed). 
The law has been more specifically stated in the 
New Mexico criminal case of State v. Thompson, 68 
N.M. 219, 360 P. 2d 637, 639 (1961), where the Su-
preme Court of that state upheld a trial judge in 
refusing to permit appellant to interrogate prospective 
jurors on voir dire as to their attitude and frame of 
mind as to the law: 
"A juror's personal view as to the law or what 
it should be is not a proper subject of inquiry 
on voir dire examination; he is bound by the law 
received from the court." (citing authority) 
Consequently, the trial judge in this case com-
mitted prejudicial error by interrogating prospective 
jurors as to their feelings and attitude toward the law 
of condemnation as applied in the State of Utah. Such 
is apparent by a comparison of the quoted portions of 
the Gregarious and Thompson cases with the language 
of the district judge where he asked (Tr. 18) : 
"Third, I would like you to tell me generally, 
how you feel about this particular Jaw of con-
demnation." 
If this Court believes that the method followed by 
the trial judge in this case is proper, then it might 
ponder the interrogation of the prospective jurors by 
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the trial judge, or counsel, as to their feelings concern-
ing the following question: 
"Members of the jury, the law of eminent do-
main does not permit a landowner in a condem. 
nation case to recover for the following expense.1 
which he must necessarily incur: 
(1) Attorney's fees; 
(2) Appraiser's fees, except to the extent of 
recovering $6.00 per day while the ap· 
praiser appears in Court (plus 20c per 
mile one way from the appraiser's resi· 
dence to the place of trial; and 
( 3) Business and similar losses not directly 
related to the value associated with his 
real property holdings. 
I want each of you to express your thoughts 
as to whether you believe the landowner should 
or should not be entitled to recover any or all 
of the foregoing expenses in an action of this 
k . d" Ill . 
In a subsequent condemnation case, where the same 
procedure of interrogating the jurors had been followed 
as was done in this case, the trial judge in this case 
refused to interrogate the prospective jurors concerning 
their thinking as to the foregoing matters, and would 
not permit counsel for the landowners to do so. It is 
submitted that no real distinction can be drawn which, 
once the door is opened, does not give both sides a fair 
exposure to a prospective juror's inner thinking. 
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II. 
PERMITTING THE JURY TO VIEW THE 
PREMISES, WHICH HAD BEEN SUBSTAN-
TIALLY OBLITERATED AND ALTERED, 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 'VHICH 
WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANTS' 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
During the trial plaintiff requested that the jury 
be permitted to view the premises. Defendants regis-
tered immediate objection to the request (Tr. 190) 
inasmuch as the entire area involved was greatly altered 
in appearance by reason of the large mounds of earth 
placed in the involved area and, worse still - since 
defendants' premise supporting their value claim was 
that the subject property being condemned had value 
as a service station site-every indication of the five-
pointed street intersection on which the property origi-
nally faced was completely obliterated and destroyed. 
Rule 47 (j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
gives the trial judge discretion as to whether a jury 
view of the property which is the subject of litigation 
or of the place in which any material fact occurred 
should be permitted. No special rule or statute applies 
to the field of eminent domain as in some states-the 
one cited Rules applies in all civil cases. 
In exercising this discretion the trial court should 
look to the utility in serving the judicial purpose as this 
Court did in the case of Stevens v. Memmott, 9 Utah 
2d 37, 337 P. 2d 418 (1959). In the Stevens case this 
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Court was concerned with the ascertainment of clarity 
and with the effect of the jury view upon that quest 
On page 420 this Court briefly stated the general 
guidelines to be followed by the lower courts: 
"We feel also that the court did not err in re. 
fusing to permit the jury to take a view of the 
disputed claims, since the evidence indicated that 
such a view would have led as much or more to 
confusion as it would to clarity." 
Furthermore, this Court has indicated generally 
what facts give rise to the confusion mentioned in the 
Stevens case. In Balle v. Smith, 81Utah179, 17 P. 2d 
224 ( 1932) , the discretion of the trial judge, in refusing 
to permit a view of a model T Ford coupe loaded with 
five persons to resemble circumstances which existed 
at the time of the accident, was upheld on the ground 
that time had wrought changes which would confuse 
the jurors. This Court emphasized that about fifteen 
months had elapsed between the time of the accident 
and the day of the trial, during which time the boys 
and girls had increased in weight and size. 
The rule as it applies to eminent domain cases is 
well stated by Judge Inch in the case of United State,1 
v. 4,475.23 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Towns of 
Riverhead and Brookhaven, County of Suffolk, State 
of New York, 151 F. Supp, 590, 591 (D. C. N. Y 
1957), Affirmed, 254 F. 2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1958): 
"While a view of the property by the Cour~, 
jury or commission is not now required, it is 
considered advisable, where possible, and when 
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the physical characteristics of the land and im-
prov~men~s have not so changed since the taking 
as to impair the value of personal inspection ... " 
The precise issue involved in this case arose in the 
case of Ajootian v. Director of Public W arks, 90 R.I. 
96, 155 A. 2d 244 ( 1959) . That case involved the taking 
of a 2V2 story wooden frame dwelling for freeway 
purposes. On appeal the landowner had alleged error 
in allowing a view of the premises. Directing its atten-
tion to the proper procedure which a trial judge should 
use in exercising his discretion regarding a view of 
the premises, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quoted 
on page 246 from its prior opinion in the case of State 
v. Smith, 70 R. I. 500, 41 A. 2d 153, 157: 
"But when an objection on grounds other than 
those purely legal is made to a motion that a 
view be taken, the trial justice should not pass 
upon the motion pro forma. He should require 
sufficient information respecting its merits so 
that he may intelligently exercise his discretion 
in deciding whether it was reasonably necessary 
for the better understanding of the evidence for 
the expedition of the trial and in protecting the 
rights of all interested parties. The burden of 
satisfying him that the taking of the view at 
such time is reasonably necessary under all the 
circumstances is upon the moving party in this 
instance, the state." 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court continued by 
holding in regard to the sole issue upon appeal that the 
trial judge had abused his discretion in allowing a view 
of the condemned premises. In the words of that court 
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" ( t) he effect of the view ... allowed the jury to 
see the property long after it was taken by the State 
and after the condition of the premises had materially 
changed for the worse." In conclusion the court spok~ 
thusly, on page 247: 
"We are of the opinion that the customary 
purpose for which a view is ordinarily allowed 
was not shown in this case. In the circumstances 
previously outlined, the trial justice's action was 
clearly an abuse of discretion which was preju-
dicial to the petitioners' right to a fair hearing .. 
The Ajootian case is not the only case to be found 
which has faced the issue at hand. Other reported cases 
are to be found which point out the importance of the 
facts and the law involved in each appeal. 
By way of example, in the case of Oregon-Wash· 
ington R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 
Pac. 1065 ( 1921), an objection was raised to the view 
on the grounds of material alteration because of the 
construction of the railroad prior to trial. The appellate 
court held that there had been no abuse of discretion. 
A look at the facts points out that no alteration of the 
premises existed to the degree that it would confuse 
the jurors or create an injustice by precluding the jurors 
from visualizing the property as it existed at the time 
of the taking. The facts show that the railroad merely 
condemned a right-of-way through a large tract of 120 
acres. 
In contradistinction to the case last cited, the case 
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at bar poses a situation where major alterations had 
occurred prior to trial. The original tract contained 
0.83 acre which was not subjected to a public easement 
(Tr. 39), and from that acreage there was actually 
used in construction 0.59 acre (Tr. 41). At the time 
of trial, construction activities on the taken property 
had been in progress for nearly two years (Tr. 39~ 
and a six foot chain link fence which divided the taking 
from the remainder had been erected (Tr. 42). Ap-
proximately 25 feet of fill had been placed adjacent to 
the property (Tr. 43) and one of the two streets abut-
ting the subject premises, 26th Street, had been ended 
or made into a cul-de-sac at a point east of the subject 
property and at a point which denied the subject prop-
erty any access to 26th Street. 
The alterations above mentioned are of particular 
significance when it is considered that the highest and 
best use of the subject property, as testified to by the 
landowner's expert witness (Tr. 66), was for a service 
station or other type of automotive service site. As 
admitted by the state's appraiser (Tr. 139), accessi-
bility and view are important characteristics in selecting 
a service station site. Both of these characteristics had 
been severely impaired by construction activities. Of 
particular importance is the change in appearance 
created by the obliteration of 26th Street at its con-
fluence with Pennsylvania Avenue, at which confluence 
or intersection the subject property was located. 
The state of the statutory law concerning Jury 
views is also reflected in the written case law. The 
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statutes or rules of many states give an absolute right 
to a jury view. This absolute right is claimed by a mere 
request for a jury view by one party. These statute~ 
are particularly likely to be found as special legislation 
dealing with eminent domain. Cases where a jury view 
has been required by statute under circumstances where 
the appellant claimed a change in the conditions of the 
premises include the cases of South Park Com'rs v. 
Livingston, 344 Ill. 368, 176 N .E. 546 ( 1931), and 
City of Akron v. Alexander, 5 Ohio St. 2d 75, 214 N.E. 
2d 89 ( 1966). It is interesting to note what the Ohio 
Supreme Court said about the jury view in eminent 
domain cases even though the interpretation of a 
mandatory statue was involved. In upholding the trial 
judge who had refused to allow a jury view the court 
said on page 91 : 
"The purpose of the statute, in light of the 
previously stated rules of law, is to provide for 
just compensation to a property owner and t~ 
provide. the jury with assistance when the ev1· 
dence is complex or unclear. In a case where the 
view would cause an injustice to the property 
owner and deprive him of compensation to which 
he is entitled, and where the evidence of valua· 
tion is not alleged to be complex or unclear, the 
legislative purpose would not be served in grant· 
ing a view of the premises." 
Another Illinois case, but one which was not con· 
cerned with a mandatory statute, is the case of City of 
Chicago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, 173 N.E. 666 (1930). 
That case is directly in point and represents a decision 
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where the trial judge was overruled for abuse of dis-
cretion in allowing a jury view of condemned premises 
which had materially deteriorated. The taking involved 
the west seventeen feet of a tract with a four story brick 
building. The taking was sufficient to destroy the 
existing structure, making the lot suitable for only a 
small building. In the interim between the taking and 
trial the building had been vacated and had deteriorated 
through nonuse and possibly vandalism. In determining 
whether the trial court had abused its discretion the 
Illinois Supreme Court discussed the danger in allow-
ing a jury view of condemned properties which had 
physically changed. The reasoning behind the court's 
decision to reverse the trial court is given on page 668: 
"It was a matter within the discretion of the 
trial court to permit or deny a view of the prem-
ises, subject to review for abuse of that discre-
tion. Was it an abuse of discretion to permit the 
jury to view the premises in this case? 
* * • 
"Much valid objection may be seen to a view 
by the jury in a case of this character. There is 
no method by which there may be preserved in 
a bill of exceptions the evidence of the manner 
in or extent to which the minds of the various 
members of the jury were impressed by a view 
of a building, and where, as here, such changes 
have taken place as to render a view of no assist-
ance to the jury, for the reason that the condition 
at the time of the trial does not reflect the value 
as of the time the petition was filed, it is an abuse 
of discretion to permit such view. It will be 
conceded that a photograph which does not 
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present a true picture of an object as of the 
time to which the evidence concerning it relies 
is not admissible in evidence except it be with 
a full explanation of the changes, and we are 
of the opinion that in this case the building 
showed such deterioration that a view of the 
premises ~hould not have been permitted. Such 
view could scarcely have been said to be of any 
assistance to the jury in understanding the evi-
dence offered concerning the property." 
The rea.soning of the Koff case is echoed in the 
case of City of Cleveland v. Carcione, ll8 Ohio App. 
525, 190 N.E. 2d 52, 5 A. L. R. 2d 52 (1963), where 
the trial court was declared to have abused its discretion 
in allowing a jury view of condemned property which 
had deteriorated subsequent to the resolution of taking. 
The appellate court reasoned that no useful purpose 
was served in permitting the jury view and that in the 
state of the record to do so was prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the appellant. , 
III 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
IN PERMITTING AN UNQUALIFIED WIT-
NESS TO GIVE EXPERT OPINION TESTI-
MONY. 
As part of plaintiff's case it offered George M. 
Jay as an expert witness for the purpose of giving 
testimony concerning the subject property as not being 
a good service station site (Tr. 95). His qualifications 
consisted of being the area sales representative for 
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Standard Oil Company of California (Tr. 91), pri-
marily involved in selling merchandise to the various 
Chevron stations. Over objections of defendants' coun-
sel, Mr.Jay was permitted to testify that, in his personal 
opinion, the subject property " . . . would (not) make 
a good service station site." (Tr. 95) · 
There is no doubt that the law in Utah leaves the 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, 
as stated in the condemnation case of Weber Basin 
1Vater District v. Nel,son, 358 P. 2d 81, 11Utah2~ 253 
(1960), where this Court said: 
"The matter of proper foundation or qualifi- . 
cation of a witness to state an opinion, where 
the same is permissible in evidence, lies largely 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
The determination of the trial court will not be 
disturbed except in extreme cases where it is 
manifest that the trial court abused .its discre-. " . . . 
tion. 
In making their objections to Mr. Jay's testimony, 
defendants objected to the foundation and ba'ckground 
of the witness on two separate points: 
( 1) The witness was unfamiliar with the subject 
property. 
A. Now in your opinion, what kind of service 
station site would this subject property that 
is showed in pink? · · 
MR. FULLER: 
We object. There is absolutely no foundation 
to show the familiarity of this witness to this 
site. 
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THE COURT: 
Do you know where we are talking about? 
A. I think it is a little piece that is fenced off, 
is it not, your honor? I am not familiar with 
the footage. 
Q. Are you familiar with the intersection of 
26th and Pennsylvania Avenue prior to the 
construction of the freeway in that area? 
A. Yes, but I never paid much attention to it, 
to tell you the truth. (Tr. 94) 
(2) The witness had insufficient qualification to 
serve as f oundatiorn for the giving of an opinion con-
cerning the subject property as a service station site. 
Q. Now, what type of traffic would you say is 
on Pennsylvania Avenue? 
A. I would say the majority of your travel on 
Pennsylvania Avenue is people going to and 
from the Marquardt Plant. 
* * * I I 
A. I think tl1'tt, I have never made a study of it. I 
I think that is where most of them are going. ! 
MR. FULLER: 
We move the testimony be stricken. With no . 
study, it is simply a supposition, your Honor. , 
(Tr. 93-94) I 
* * * 
Q. Have you ever studied the State Highway 
Commission's statistics in that area? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Do you know, or have an opinion as to what 
volume of traffic flow is there? 
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MR. BROWN: 
I object to this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
He may ask. 
Q. Do you know, or do you have an opinion as 
to what volume of traffic flow would encou-
rage an oil company to. set up a station on 
this street if its location were proper? 
A. I can't answer that because I don't have the 
information. 
Q. I take it then that you do not know either 
in terms of volume or flow or actual destina-
nation what the real destination or source of 
traffic on Pennsylvania Avenue is? 
A. That is right. 
* * * 
(Tr. 99) 
' 
Q. Do you have an opinion, then, as to what type 
of service station, to what extent this could 
be developed as a service station site? 
MR. FULLER: 
We raise our objection, no foundation at all. 
THE COURT: 
Answer the question, whether you do or do 
not have an opinion as to whether or not 
that would be a desirable service station or 
not? 
A. I will give my personal opinion. I do 1J0t have 
the background M a proper development 
man to tell you, that, to tell whether it woul~ 
or not. I will give my personal opinion. Thats 
all I can give. (emphasis added) . 
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MR. FULLER: 
Now we would object to that. 
A. That's all I can do. 
Q. I think there is a foundation as much as l\Ir. 
Welch's foundation to give his personal • 
opinion. 
THE COURT: 
Don't argue at this time .You can argue later. 
The Court will rule that this is legal evi-
dence, you can give whatever value you see 
fit. Answer the question. (Tr. 95) 
* * * 
MR. FULLER: 
And, I take it you are not too familiar with 
the prices that are paid for sites for service 
stations by your company? 
A. No, I am not. (Tr. 96) 
* * * 
Q. Now, what type of a service station site would 
you have to have, do you think, in your opin· 
ion, to pay $35,000.00 for it? 
MR. FULLER: 
We object, the witness just isn't qualified. 
THE COURT: 
Answer the question if you can. 
A. I can't answer that. I don't know what kind 
of property you have to have. 
Q. Could you estimate? 
A. It is not in my realm of knowledge of the 
service station business or where they develop 
the property. (Tr. 102) 
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It is respectfully submitted that to permit a witness 
to testify as to whether a given property is or is not a 
good service station site, over objections timely made, 
where a witness ( l) was unfamiliar with the subject 
property and ( 2) by his own admissions was not quali-
fied to give such an OP.inion, constituted an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances. 
IV. 
THE REFERENCE MADE BY PLAIN-
TIFF'S COUNSEL DURING CLOSING ARGU-
MENT TO THE JURORS AS TAXPAYERS 
WHO WOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF THE 
VERDICT WAS AN APPEAL TO THE SELF-
INTEREST OF THE JURORS CONSTITUT-
lNG PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND REQUIR-
ING A NEW TRIAL. 
During the course of his closing argument, counsel 
for the State Road Commission made reference to pay-
ment of the verdict from public funds and to the jurors 
as taxpayers. The exact words of counsel are found 
in the transcript (Tr. 182): 
"Now, everyone agrees that the Marriott 
family is entitled to receive just compensation 
for this property being acquired by the State 
Road Commission. On the other hand, it would 
be unjust to award a windfall at the expense 
of the public purse. You people are tax :g~yers, 
all of us in this courtroom are tax payers. 
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Counsel for the defendant landowners, not wanting 
to call undue attention to the improper reference, made 
immediate objection by handing the judge a note whicli 
appears in the record with the defendants' proposed 
Instruction ( R. 42). That note reads as follows: 
"Judge Wahlquist: 
We take exception to the argument relating 
to reference to the "public purse" and "you tax-
payers must pay for this;" etc. 
"We believe it to be reversible error, unless a 
clear admonition is given to the jury on the mat· 
ter ." (Initialed) G.E.F. 
The admonition sought by defendants' counsel was 
not given by the district judge. Neither at the conclu· 
sion of the plaintiff's closing argument (Tr. 187) nor 
at the conclusion of all argument (Tr. 190) were the 
jurors admonished to disregard their self-interest as 
taxpayers. The only subsequent reference to the jurors 
as taxpayers was made by defendants' counsel during 
his closing argument when he attempted to repair the 
damage done by plaintiff's counsel (Tr. 189). 
After the jury had retired the district judge quoted 
for the record the written objection of counsel for the 
landowners (Tr. 190). Formal exception to the remarks 
of counsel for the State Road Commission were then 
made of record (Tr. 192). 
The authorities are unanimously in agreement that 
appeals to sympathy, passion and prejudice should 
not be allowed. Appeals to class prejudices such as 
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appeals to the self interest of jurors as taxpayers are 
highly improper and are not to be condoned. State-
ments in argument that any verdict recovered against 
a governmental unit must be satisfied from tax funds 
and thus indirectly paid by the jurors and other tax-
payers, have uniformly been regarded as highly im-
proper appeals to the self-interest of the jurors. Eager 
v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P. 2d 1003 (1966); 
Sullivan v. County of Allegheny, 187 Pa. Super. 370, 
144 A. 2d 498 (1958); Mississippi State Highway 
Cornmission v. Hall, 252 Miss. 863, 174 So. 2d 488 
(1965); 53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 499; Annotation, 33 
A. L. R. 2d 442 (1954). 
This Court noted in the case of Eager v. Willis, 
supra, its agreement with the well-established rule that 
appeals to sympathy, passion and prejudice should not 
be condoned. On page 1007 of the regional reporter 
this Court said: 
" We have no disagreement with the 
authorities cited to the effect that pleas plainly 
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire passion 
or prejudice should not be allowed ... " 
The reasoning behind the rule as it applies to 
appeals to the self-interest of jurors as taxpayers is 
well-stated in Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 
191, .58 So. 2d 115 ( 1952). In that case the plaintiff 
sought to recover against a municipal corporation for 
damages alleged to have been suffered by her from 
a fall over a defect in a city sidewalk. The attorney 
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for the defendant municipal corporation made a state-
ment to the jury which appears on page 116 and whicli 
reads in part : 
"If the plaintiff is given a verdict, where will 
the money come from 1 It will come out of tliP 
city treasury. The city has no money of its mm 
The only money which it has is money which ii 
gets from taxes . . " 
In commenting upon the above-quoted statement 
the Supreme Court of Alabama said on page lHi: 
"In effect counsel for the defendant told the 
members of the jury that if they gave the plain· 
tiff a verdict, they were taking the money out 
of their own pockets. It was in effect the same 
as saying that it would be they themselves to-
gether with other taxpayers who would pay the 
plaintiff if she was given a verdict. 'Ve think 
it clearly appears that the argument of counsel 
was an appeal to the prejudices of the jurors ,, 
This same condemnatory language applies equally 
well to the facts here involved. Counsel for the State 
Road Commission informed the jurors that the money 
to pay their verdict must come from the "public purse". 
The jurors were then expressly, and more directly thau 
in the Williams case, reminded that they were all tax· 
payers. 
This prohibition against argument designed to 
elicit sympathy and inspire prejudice is applicable to 
both sides in eminent domain cases; the prohibition 
acts as a two-edged sword. Such is obvious from the 
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case of 1l1is~issippi, Highway Commission v. Deavours, 
251 Miss. 552, 170 So. 2d 639 ( 1965), where a reversal 
was obtained on the grounds that testimony was ad-
mitted, over objection, as to the federal government's 
participtaion in road projects for which land was con-
demned and as to the appraiser for the highway com-
mission being a treaspasser for having failed to secure 
permission before entering upon the land to be con-
demned. 
This Court has previously held that argument 
which tends to incite sympathy or arouse prejudice by 
inviting the jury to resolve any doubt it might have 
in favor of one party constitutes a ground for reversal. 
In the case of Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co .. 
107 Utah 20, 151 P. 2d 465 (1944), such error was 
considered as ground for revarsal. In the concurring 
opinion of three justices, the argument by counsel. to 
the jury to the effect that the bus company was a foreign 
corporation, that it would pay an.y judgment rendered, 
and that its property within the state could be levied 
upon in satisfaction of the judgment was irrelevant, 
improper and constituted a ground for reversal. 
Likewise, the Court in the case of Willia1ns v. City 
of A rl!niston, supra, thought the argument of counsel, 
making reference to the jurors as taxpayers who would 
bear the burden of their own verdict, was of such a 
prejudicial nature as to constitute a ground for rever-
sal. The prejudicial statement of counsel in that case 
has previously been quoted and compared to the words 
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of counsel here questioned. In g1vmg its sole grour1r] 
for reversal the Alabama Supreme Court held on pagt 
116: 
"\Ve have carefully considered the argumenl 
which counsel for the defendant was allowed to 
make in the defendant's behalf to the jury. Thest 
statements are obviously an appeal to the self. 
interest of the jurors as taxpayers and are ol 
such a prejudicial nature as to constitute a 
ground for reversal. (citing authority)." 
In the case of West v. State, 150 S. W. 2d 363, 
366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), the court thought the argu· 
ment of counsel to be so highly prejudicial that a rever· 
sal would be required, even in the absence of objection. 
That case involved the laws of eminent domain and 
four improper statements from counsel. The first two 
were made in opening argument with no objection, 
and the last two were made in closing argument when 
objection had been overruled. No admonition or specific 
instruction was given by the judge to the jury. 
"Counsel's argument to the jury (1) "Youare[ 
the taxpayers"; ( 2) "The taxpayers will har.e 
to pay the bill"; ( 3) "You as taxpayers are d1· 
rectly interested in this suit"; ( 4) "'Vhen you go· 
above $25 per acre you ":!11 be tak~ng th~ money i 
out of your own pockets are plamly direct ap·: 
peals to the self-interest and prejudice of the' 
jurors. Such arguments have many times been 
held to constitute reversible error . . . " 
In Doty v. Jacksonville, 106 Fla. 1, 142 So. 599, 
601 ( 1932), a condemnation proceeding, counsel for 
the city in his argument was permitted, over objection, 
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" ... to state to the jury that when they re-
tired to consider their verdict they should keep 
in mind that whatever is paid to defendant as 
compensation for the pro_perty would come out 
of the pocket of the tax payers, and that the 
jury as tax payers would pay a part of whatever 
should be allowed to the defendant for his prop-
erty." 
Objection to this line of argument was made, 
and the objection overruled. This constituted .re-
versible error. Counsel for the city mad~ some 
subsequent effort to qualify and explain this 
argument, but the damage had been done, and 
we are clearly of the opinion that such argument 
was improper, and, in its tendency, prejudicial 
to the defendants' case. (citing authority)" 
The last two cited cases have held respectively that 
prejudicial error resulted even in the absence of an 
objection and that'subsequent qualifications and expla-
nations by offending counsel were insufficient to eradi-
cate the error. All cases have not followed such strict 
1 rules. In fact, most cases would appear to follow the 
rule that prejudicial error results from an unprovoked 
argument of counsel, directing the jurors' attention 
, to the fact that any judgment recovered in the action 
will be paid from tax funds, when such argument is 
not effectively corrected at the trial. Stewart v. Idaho 
Falls, 61 Idaho 471, 103 P. 2d 697 (1940); Huggins 
V. Hanrnibal, 280 S. W. 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926); An-
notation, 33 A. L. R. 2d 442 (1954). 
In the instant case, counsel for the defendants 
made a timely and strenuous objection. Such objection 
was made by the means counsel thought most apprr, 
priate to prevent the arousal of further prejudice in tlii 
jury by emphasizing and belaboring their status a~ 
taxpayers. Counsel's objection specifically asked tilt 
trial judge to admonish the jury on the matter in order 
to prevent reversible error. Still, the judge uttered nor 
one word of admonition to the jury concerning their 
status as taxpayers and their interest in the law~ur' 
arising out of such status (Tr. 190). 
In the words of the Court in the Huggins case at 
page 75, 
" . . . ( t) he only proper remedy, if any, m 
such a situation is for the court, upon objectiou 
being made, "to promptly and eff ectiYely rebuke 
counsel so as to strongly impress the jury witlr 
the unfairnes of the procedure, and to deter them 
from giving the least 'veight to an argument so 
hostile to the pure administration of justice, 
(citing authority)". 
The test to be a pp lied in determining whether a 
fair and impartial trial was had or whether prejudice 
resulted from the argument of counsel has been stated 
in varying ways. In Williams v. City of AnniYto11, 
supra, the Alabama Supreme Court said on page 117: 
"The point is advanced that the argument 
should not be regarded as prejudicial beca~se 
there was ample evidence to support the yerd1cl 
by the jury regardless of the argument .. The 
test however is not that the arirument did un· 
' ' u • ·It lawfullv influence the wrdict, but that it n11g1 
have d~ne so (citing authority)". 
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This Court has stated the test somewhat differently 
in the case of Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P. 
2d 1003, 1005 ( 1966). In that case this Court saw no 
transgression of principles previously stated by counsel 
for defendant having asked the jurors to consider tpem~ 
selves in the situation of the plaintiff. 
"The question here involved is whether the 
case was presented to the jury in such a manner 
that it is reasonable to believe that the parties 
had an opportunity to present their evidence 
and have a fair and impartial trial by the Court 
and jury. If that result has been accomplished 
irregularities or minor errors should be disre-
garded. Reversal of a judgment is justified only 
when there is some error of such a substantial 
nature that there is a likelihood that the result 
would have been different in its absence." 
It is respectfully submitted that there is a likelihood 
that the result would have been different in the absence 
of statements to which objection is here made. This is 
strongly pointed out by a comparison of the evidence 
with the jury verdict. Testimony in this case was highly 
conflicting. The State's appraiser gave a figure o'f 
$7,500.00 as the value of 0.83 acre of land (Tr. 123), 
while the landowners' appraiser testified to a value. of 
$35,000.00 (Tr. 73). The jury verdict did not vary one 
cent from the figure testified to by the State's appraiser. 
In a case where the testimony was so highly conflicting, 
the jury verdict clearly shows the influence of preju-
dice. 
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v. 
PR EJ U DIC I AL AND ERRONEOU 
STATEl\1ENTS OF LA "\V CONTAINED I:i 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DEPRIVED DE 
FENDANT LANDO"\VNERS OF A FAIR AXD 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
No jury instructions were given which effecfoel! 
corrected the error committed by counsel in referrin~ 
to the jurors as taxpayers with the burden of satisfyini 
their own verdict. In fact, the jury instructions gim 
by the trial judge compounded the error which 1rn 
subsequently committed by counsel for the State Roarl 
Commission. The trial judge even stated for the recora 
that the instructions gave emphasis to the law again~i 
sympathy and prejudice in favor of the landowners 
Defendants took exception to several of the Instructiolli 
given by the Court to the jury, claiming generally th:il 
the instructions supported the position taken by counsel 
for plaintiff in his closing argument wherein he referre1l 
to the "public purse" and that the jurors are "taxpay- g1v 
ers", and also objected to the instructions as bein~. 
definitely slanted and adverse against the propert) '. 
owners due to repetition and emphasis contained there· 
in (Tr. 191-193). 
The Instructions to which exceptions were taken. 
insofar as material to this argument, are as follows: : 
stn 
"No. 8. ~d 
h '· n " ... If, in your deliberation, you .bel!eve t 31 of 
1 
the evidence introduced by both parties 1s even!) 
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st 
'S, 
al 
el 
balanced and the evidence of one party . is no 
more believable than the evidence of the other 
' then you will reject the contentions advanced 
by the defendant land owner." (emphasis added) 
(R. 159) 
"No. 9. 
" ... Specifically, if the defendant landown-
ers fail to prove the truthfulness of the facts 
which they allege by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, you will find against the defendant land-
owners in your deliberation of such fact." (em-
phasis added) ( R. 160 ) 
"No. 15. 
"You are instructed that feelings and expres-
sions of sympathy and generosity toward the 
landowners have no place in the trial of this 
matter. Nor should such feelings or expressions 
be present in your deliberations or play any part 
therein, nor shall you assess any damages or · 
compensation for any such feelings or expres-
sions ... ,, 
(R. 166) 
:11 After exceptions were taken to the Instructions as 
y· given, the Court stated: 
~n. 
" ... There is somewhat more emphasis than 
I realized in the instructions going against sym-
pathy and prejudice and this type of thing, but 
I do not believe it will prejudice this jury. I 
will leave it stand." (Tr. 193) 
The trial judge was ref erring specifically to In-
struction No. 15 ( R. 43 & Tr. 166) . That instruction 
1 
admonishes the jury against "feelings and expressions 
~ " 
1Jr of sympathy and generosity toward the landowners 
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(emphasis added). There is no corresponding instrut ac 
tion making reference to feeling and expressions n: fe 
sympathy and generosity toward the State. Such an pi 
instruction admonishing in regard to prejudice again.1; bt 
the landowner and for the State was clearly necessar
1 
B 
to balance the instructions, particularly in light of th1 2c 
unfortunate statements made by plaintiff's counse1 2! 
during his closing argument. Furthermore, Instructio11 81, 
No. 15 is repetitive of the exact principle by again mak L 
ing reference to sympathy for the landowners, thu1 31 
giving undue prominence to such admonition. b: 
The giving of instructions which are unbalancea 
in favor of one party and which give undue prominence 
to legal principles favorable to either side is contrary 
to sound judicial practice and constitutes reversible 
error. This Court specifically held that unbalancea 
instructions which influenced the jury in bringing it~ 
verdict of no cause of action constituted reversible error. 
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073 (1955). 
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has held as fol· 
lows in Evans v. Holsinger, 242 Iowa 870, 48 N. "" 
2d 250, 255 ( 1951) : 
0 
p 
" ... It is well established that undue prorni· s1 
nence should not be given, in the court's instruc· 
tions, to any matter favorable to either side; ano 
that correct statements of the law if repeatea 
to the point of such undue emphasis, may con· 
stitute reversible error." 
In Instruction No. 8 (R. 43 & Tr. 159) and again 
in Instruction No. 9 (R. 43 & Tr. 160) the jury t) 
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rut advised as to the burden of proof resting upon the de-
; n: fendant landowners. Such repetition of a burden of 
an proof instruction to the point of undue emphasis has 
rn1; been held upon appeal to constitute reversible error. 
1ar1 Boruchi v. McLaughlin, 344 Ill. App. 550, 101 N. E. 
tht 2d 624 (1951); O'Gallagher v. Finkel, 7 Ill. App. 2d 
nse1 296, 129 N. E. 2d 345 (1955); Evans v. Holsinger, 
tio11 supra. This Court held in the case of Shields v. Utah 
iak Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349, 
hu1 351 ( 1940) , that reversible error resulted from emphasis 
1cea 
:net 
·ary 
ib!t 
CeG 
it~ 
ror. 
15). 
fol· 
"" 
by reiteration. 
" ... The reiteration of given propositions' 
to the jury in the instructions does not have judi-
cial approval. (citing authority)" 
* * * 
" . . . And the resulting emphasis on applic-
able laws favorable to plaintiff's side as a result 
of the continual reference and repeating of cer-
tain law propositons resulted in the unbalancing 
of the charge, and error." 
Specific objection is here made to the last sentence 
of Instruction No. 8 and the last sentence of the first 
paragraph of Instruction No. 9. The first of these two 
1rni· sentences, from Instruction No. 8, is here reproduced: 
rue· 
ano 
1tea 
:on· 
rain 
' 
"If, in your deliberation, you believe that the 
evidence introduced by both parties is evenly 
balanced and the evidence of one party is no 
more believable than the evidence of the other, 
then you will reject the contentions advanced 
by the defendant landowner." (emphasis added) 
(R. 43 & Tr. 159) 
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This sentence and also the sentence to which refer-
ence has been made in Instruction No. 9, announce a 
proposition which cannot be supported by law. Thest 
sentences announce to the jury an "all or nothing 
proposition which has no place in a condemnation case. 
These sentences directly advise the jurors to "rejeti 
(all) the contentions advanced by the defendant land-
owners" in the event the evidence is evenly balanced. 
This is simply a matter of instructing the jury to fina 
in a sum equal to that testified to by the State Roacl 
Commission should the evidence be equally balanced. 
This is nothing short of a directed verdict in many con-
demnation cases such as the one at bar. 
A similar instruction was assigned as error in tlie 
condemnation case of State of Idaho ex. rel. Rich t'. 
Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 95, 286 P.2d 1112, 1117 
( 1955). Instruction No. 15 in that case reads as fol· 
lows: 
"You are instructed that the burden of proof 
as to the value of the land taken and the dam· 
ages which result to the property not taken i~ 
upon the defendants in this case. If in your 
opinion, the defendants have not carried the bur· 
den of proof in establishing value and damages 
in this case your verdict shall not be in excesi 
of the amonnt established by the State of Idnho 
as values and damages." (emphasis added) 
In reviewing the case because of the error contained 
in Instruction No. 15, the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
"The instruction as given assumed a fact to 
exist which is not evidence, namely, that respond· 
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ent had established by some method or means 
the value of the land taken and amount of the 
damages to the remainder. 
"It is the province of the jury to evaluate the 
pertinent testimony of all the witnesses and fix 
the value of the land· taken and the damage to 
the remainder because of the severance from the 
whole. The instructions as given limited the 
amount of the recovery to an undetermined, 
assumed, established sum. The burden of prov-
ing the amount of damages sustained, i.e., the 
value of the land taken and resultant damage 
to the remainder, must be borne by appellants. 
VVhether such burden has been sustained is a 
question for the jury to determine. The second 
sentence of said instruction above quoted should 
not have been given." (emphasis added) 
This Court has specifically held that errors and 
irregularities in jury instructions, such as those here 
[. presented, constitute reversible error. The personal 
injury case of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 
1f 134, 279 P. 2d I 073, 1077 ( 1955) , so holds: 
d 
I: 
0 
j. 
"Even assuming that the instructions of the 
court taken in their entirety could be considered 
correct as given, the continual repetition of in-
structions on contributory negligence and the 
positive delineation of the duties of the plain-
tiffs, as contrasted with the qualified negative 
statements of the duties of the defendants, un-
balanced the instructions in favor of the defend-
ants and influenced the jury in bringing its 
verdict of no cause of action as against all three 
plaintiffs, and the ref ore constituted reversible 
error." 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion should amply justify, 
holding that these defendants did not have a fair a11J 
impartial trial; in short, that they did not have ·'their 
day in court". Applying the general rule that situation, 
of this type should be measured by the standard nl 
whether there was a reasonable possibility that the jur) 
was influenced by the claimed prejudicial errors com· 
mitted, it would be well to again refer to the statemenl 
of the trial judge (Tr. 193) when he stated: 
" ... There is somewhat more emphasis thau 
I realized in the instructions going against sym· 
pathy and prejudice and this type of thing, bu! 
I do not believe it will prejudice this jury." 
Obviously, the trial judge did not expect the verdid 
to be returned on the basis of the lowest testimoni 
given, since the remark can only be interpreted as a 
belief that the verdict would be higher. Stated cou· 
versely, the comment implies that the effect of prejudice 
would be present in a verdict exactly amounting to ibe 
lowest testimony furnished. 
It is respectfully submitted that justice can uni)", 
be served in this case by reversing and remanding the, 
matter for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
ORV AL C. HARRISON 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellanb 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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